The situation is quite scandalous, unacceptable and unprecedented in any of the other fleets at this present time.
The Black Sea fleet has broken the world record, and moved into first place. I think that it is a disgrace not only for the Black Sea fleet, but also for the navy as a whole. 1 Romuald Muklevich, the Commander of the Soviet Naval Forces.
In the mid-1920s, much to the horror of the Red Navy's high command, the Black Sea fleet was reportedly the most venereally diseased fleet in the world. This article will use the case study of the Black Sea fleet in the city of Sevastopol between 1922 and 1928 to explore Soviet command's perception of venereal diseases as a threat to the security of the Soviet state during the unstable first peacetime decade of its existence. 2 It will also interrogate the ways in which high command directed the local campaign against venereal diseases. Their discussions reveal how the discourse surrounding these diseases was often linked with wider questions of morality, sexuality and social control. The article 1 Letter from Muklevich to the Revolutionary Soviet for Naval Forces in the Black Sea, 14 December 1927, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota (subsequently RGAVMF) f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, Materialy ob organizatsii bor'by s venericheskimi zabolevaniiami v chernovskom flote, l. 13. 2 Until 1935, this fleet was called the Naval Forces of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Throughout this article, I will use the Black Sea fleet despite this official nomenclature. I will also use the plural venereal diseases as I am addressing perceptions of both syphilis and gonorrhoea.
3 will place its analysis in the context of a broader literature, which explores the ways in which venereal diseases are constructed by those in authority and are subject to reinterpretation depending on the specific social, political, cultural and economic conditions of a particular society. 3 The Soviet Union provides a vivid illustration of this reinterpretation, as the state financed and controlled all research on venereal diseases and their relationship with society. Both the Soviet classification and treatment of disease reveals the extent to which those in authority believed the state could legitimately interfere in the private lives of individual citizens.
A number of studies have investigated disease in the military and navy, but the majority have been focused on wartime. 4 Studying the construction of disease during peacetime illuminates the ways in which states continued to justify the surveillance of their populations in the absence of the impending threat of the invading enemy. 5 Wartime 3 Social historians have discussed this in a variety of historical periods and geographical settings. Zealand 1920 -1980 (Berlin, 2007 . 5 Philippa Levine has produced an excellent study which deals with the treatment and classification of venereal diseases in the military of the British Empire. See, P. Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing 4 studies have also emphasised how states used the urgency of combat to justify greater interference into the private lives of its populace. Scholarship on the early Soviet Union has explored how the Soviet state intervened in the everyday lives of its citizens through campaigns of so-called 'struggle' against social problems, such as petty crime and illiteracy. 6 Sexuality in the Russian and Soviet military has also become a topic of historical interest for scholars in recent years. 7 This article will build on this literature, by arguing that the Soviet state used the urgency of the Black Sea fleet's apparent rife venereal diseases to legitimise interference into both the private and intimate spheres.
The struggle with venereal diseases allowed the state to classify, regulate and probe the bodies of its servicemen, as well as to control sailors' private activities during shore leave.
As no explicit mentions of queer sexual contact were observed in archival material at the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGAVMF), this article deals specifically with heterosexual commercial sex between male servicemen and female prostitutes. However, this is not to say that same-sex relations did not happen within the Soviet Navy. 8 
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the absence of same-sex relations in discussions of sailors' sexuality is indicative of the naval authorities' rigid understanding of venereal disease transmission and stigma surrounding homosexuality. This article will begin with an overview of the struggle against venereal diseases in the early Soviet Union, and then move on to explore how the naval high command waged this campaign in the Black Sea during a period of supposed mass infection.
The struggle with venereal diseases in Russia and the Soviet Union
Late imperial and early Soviet authorities conceptualised the issue of venereal diseases in the military in the same way. Both the Imperial and Soviet Navies caused military high command the greatest anxiety, as levels of venereal diseases were consistently higher for sailors than soldiers. A medically compromised military force threatened national security. Therefore, the Imperial and Soviet states used the objective of a healthy and efficient navy to justify frequent intervention into the private lives, and even bodies, of servicemen. This section will begin with a discussion of the Russian Imperial Navy.
The struggle with venereal diseases in the military had been an important feature of late imperial policy making. In the early 1900s, high command frequently debated the best methods with which to combat disease, and recommended to sailors a wide array of prophylactic methods ranging from condoms and special ointments to total abstinence. 9
Discussions of venereal diseases in the naval forces focused on the threats that they posed 9 Some of these methods are detailed in a letter from the medical inspector of the Port of Emperor Alexander III in Libava to the commander of the port, Medical personnel were far more concerned with the sexual behaviour of sailors rather than of soldiers. Sailors had higher wages and more free time during the autumn and winter months to visit prostitutes. 11 There were also significantly higher numbers of registered prostitutes in port cities, which suggests that women migrated to these locations to work in the sex industry. For example, in 1910 the port cities of Sevastopol and Simferopol were home to seventy per cent of the entire prostitute population of Taurida province. 12 One 1901 report by Dr Grivtsova of Sevastopol revealed that levels of venereal diseases within the lower ranks were four times higher in the naval forces than those who worked on land. 13 Therefore, the imperial authorities perceived the need to control venereal diseases as particularly urgent in the context of the Navy.
The tsarist authorities and high command of the Imperial Navy both believed that the most effective way to prevent venereal diseases was to target the source, which in most cases was presumed to be the prostitute. 14 Therefore, the authorities introduced a system of regulated prostitution, which remained in place from 1843 until the fall of the autocracy in 1917. Regulation, or nadzor, was introduced with the official aim of 10 For example, the way in which venereal diseases remove men from service is discussed by the Commander of the Port of Emperor Alexander III in a letter to the governor of Kurliand province. RGAVMF controlling levels of venereal disease. In order to work legally, prostitutes were required to register their details with their local medical-police committee, a section of law enforcement in charge of ensuring that regulation ran smoothly at a regional level.
Systems of regulated prostitution also existed in France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and Spain in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. 15 Through weekly or biweekly compulsory medical examinations, the authorities monitored the sexual health of the prostitute, and incarcerated her in hospital if she was infected. 16 This system entirely failed to limit the spread of venereal diseases. Although prostitutes were legally obliged to be examined regularly, limited venereological knowledge and a lack of symptoms at the latent stages of venereal infection meant that physicians were often unable to accurately detect these diseases. 17 The examination of male clients was not legally mandated, which also contributed to the extensive spread of After the October revolution, discussions of methods for combatting disease continued, but now they took on a new significance. In the new state discourse, venereal diseases were presented as a remnant of the decadence and corruption of bourgeois capitalist society, and something completely incompatible with the socialist state. Like their pre-revolutionary counterparts, the Bolsheviks regarded prostitution as the most frequent method by which disease was spread. However, they focused on eradicating women's economic motivations for entering prostitution, such as wage inequality, frequent dismissals and a lack of provisions for childcare, rather than sanctioning regulated prostitution. 18 Alexandra Kollontai, Founder of the Women's Department, argued in 1918 that the 'disgusting, dark, debasing human evil' of prostitution would disappear after the introduction of socialism, as the state would take steps to ensure that women received increased education, employment and maternal support. 19 The Bolshevik authorities believed that the eradication of prostitution following socialism and the improvement of women's economic lot would spell an automatic end to the abundant spread of venereal diseases.
In the Soviet Union, venereal diseases were diagnosed and treated as part of the field of 'social hygiene'. This included various diseases that Soviet medicine defined as narcotic addiction. 20 This stemmed from the belief that these diseases were both biological and social phenomena, best understood within their social context. 21 Venereal diseases threatened society on three levels: they jeopardised individual health, economic production through absence, and consequently the construction of the socialist state.
Poor sexual health was therefore a public, rather than private illness. As In the 1920s, treatments for syphilis and gonorrhoea in the Soviet Union, as across Europe and North America, were often long, repetitive and ineffective. 24 Before the introduction of sulfanilamide as a cure for gonorrhoea in the late 1930s, Soviet physicians relied on silver-based treatment methods developed during the pre-revolutionary period. 25 In the late nineteenth century, Protargol (silver proteinate) was introduced as a treatment for gonorrhoea. This method was employed after sexual intercourse, and involved urinating, washing the penis with soap and water and then injecting the diluted Protargol solution directly into the urethra. 26 This treatment was often unreliable and only partly effective. 27 The treatment of syphilis was more effective, especially after the introduction of Salvarsan, the 'magic bullet' syphilis cure developed at the laboratory of Haines, an American relief worker and frequent visitor to the Soviet Union, estimated that in 1928 the total number of beds in the USSR for those requiring hospitalisation because of venereal diseases was 3540 for a population of 140,000,000; or one bed for every 40,000 people. 40 Central government advocated greater work in the provinces, but it is difficult to know exactly the extent to which this happened in practice. This article will now move on to examine how the struggle with venereal diseases worked at a regional level in the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol. I have selected this case study to explore how the campaign worked when the Soviet authorities were faced with an apparent urgent case: the fleet with the highest levels of venereal diseases in the entire world. 1. 50 ibid., l. 1. 51 ibid., l. 1. 52 The slogan in the original Russia reads as «Ни одного венерика на корабле и а часты», ibid., l. 1. 53 In this report, the average for the Caspian Flotilla in 1913 was recorded at sixteen per cent, far higher than the average for the whole Imperial Navy that year at 10.7 per cent. The Caspian Flotilla's average fell to 13.9 per cent in 1914. RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, ll. 9-10. 
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The source of venereal diseases
High command's perception of who was responsible for spreading venereal diseases in the Black Sea fleet and Sevastopol was explicitly gendered. The chain of events was allegedly always the same: unemployed or homeless women became prostitutes and then went on to infect naval personnel, a view that was reflected in civilian attitudes which also connected prostitution and venereal disease transmission. As prostitution was decriminalised following the October revolution, in most cases, city and naval authorities suggested measures that focused on preventing any more women from entering prostitution and reforming those that already had. Prostitutes were to blame for venereal diseases; however, the authorities' approach encouraged wider society to prevent pre-revolutionary period. These women needed both 'material and moral support', which the council believed was best provided through the opening of a labour dispensary (trud profilaktoriia) in Sevastopol. These institutions emerged in Moscow and other major cities from 1924 onwards, and offered women who were infected with venereal diseases (in most cases, prostitutes) paid employment, lodgings, free medical treatment and the opportunity to learn a trade. 60 The goal of the labour dispensary was to encourage women to stop working as prostitutes by training them in alternative skilled labour. The Soviet government believed that this method would eventually end both female unemployment and prostitution.
The Sevastopol Soviet was keen to organise a labour dispensary due to the success stories reported from Moscow, where apparently 'hundreds of prostitutes returned to labour' following their stays at the institution. 61 However, it is important to treat written testimony from those who entered the labour dispensary with caution, as very few accounts which attest to failure exist. The dominant narrative in both testimony and popular culture follows the same formula: desperate women who enter the dispensary who are then transformed into productive and conscious workers. 62 The focus on preventing women from entering prostitution to stop the spread of diseases reinforced the Soviet message that these diseases were matters of social hygiene, and their most effective treatment was within their social context. In February 1928, an article in Krasnyi Chernomorets also divided prostitutes into two camps. The author described the first category as 'stray wolves [who] have slipped onto the muddy path of prostitution because of need'. 67 The second category of prostitute was a 'black spot' and the active assistance of the public was required to 'root out [this] debauchery' and 'wash away the stain'. The language used implied that the second category of prostitute was irredeemable, and instead must be repressed and removed from Sevastopol. 68 This is echoed in a list of resolutions presented by the Sevastopol district committee for continuing the struggle with venereal diseases in the region. As well as recommendations for the improvement of women's employment, they included directions for dealing with so-called 'malicious prostitutes' and 'women who returned to prostitution'. 69 The authorities would forcefully evict these women from Sevastopol and liquidate the brothels in which they worked. The committee wanted these repressive measures to be visible to the public as a deterrent, so they advocated the periodic staging of show trials of those believed to be 'maliciously diseased' (zlostnye veneriki), and their wide coverage in the press. 70
The distinctions made between these two types of prostitute reveal the different ways in which the naval and civil authorities constructed venereal diseases. They argued that female unemployment and homelessness contributed to some women's entry into prostitution. These women apparently spread diseases in the absence of choice, through desperation and financial vulnerability. They also constructed another category of women who preferred to work in the financially lucrative business of prostitution despite the risk of disease, and chose to reject the labour dispensary. In this instance, disease was allegedly a tool used by these women to subvert the Soviet state and actively resist attempts to reform them into productive Soviet citizens. This classification also provided the authorities with an identifiable enemy who threatened national security even during a period of peacetime, which gave the campaign a renewed level of urgency. The struggle with venereal diseases could then be waged energetically against the women who refused to participate in the industrial construction of the Soviet state, and who deliberately infected its lines of defence.
The categories of 'maliciously diseased' and those who engaged in 'both free and paid casual sex' implies that the authorities recognised that commercial sex might not have been the only problem, despite the emphasis on prostitution in discourse. The 
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of infection and an obstacle in the struggle with venereal diseases. In a list of directives produced for various sections of political apparatus, the Health Department explained that that the role of the newspaper Krasnyi Chernomorets was to help shape negative public opinion on 'sexual promiscuity, alcoholism and prostitution'. 71 The newspaper accepted this responsibility, and opened an article with the following call to arms:
All who stand for discipline and consciousness, who struggle against promiscuity and debauchery, must cause uproar against the outpour of debauchery from the sea: syphilis, gonorrhoea and chancroid. 72
In a similar way to the classification of prostitutes into 'needy' and 'malicious' by military and civil authorities, the author created two opposing sides: actively conscious citizens of the Soviet state, and the licentious individuals who attempted to corrupt it with their diseases. Venereal diseases were clearly identified as the enemy, which stressed the urgent necessity of the wider public's participation during a period of peacetime. All decent people must participate. The creation of this tension in the casting of promiscuity as an insidious enemy allowed the Soviet authorities to legitimise the regulation of individual's sexual behaviour more generally. This is even more evident in the treatment of those who became infected. 71 Resolutions for the struggle with venereal disease, RGAVMF, f. R397, op. 3, d. 458, ll. 6-7. 72 'Nado smyt' chernoe piatno'.
The infected
In the vast majority of cases, the naval authorities in the Black Sea believed that prostitutes infected sailors. Despite this, sailors were not defined as passive recipients of diseases, and they had an active role to play in the struggle. High command intervened in The struggle with venereal diseases gave high command justification for interfering in the intimate lives and bodies of their personnel. They advocated abstinence as the most effective method for avoiding infection, but naval officers understood that implementing this was difficult in practice. To get around this, the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Black Sea fleet made it mandatory that following sexual intercourse, sailors had to report to their nearest medical point for prophylactic care. 75 Those who did not attend were to be 'brought to justice for deliberately violating their working capacity' and endangering the interests of the fleet. Even in peacetime, passivity became subversive behaviour, and privacy in matters of prophylactics was prohibited.
The term 'personal prophylactics' (lichnyi profilaktiki) does not correspond to our contemporary understanding of contraception, as in, a method applied before sexual intercourse to protect against disease. In the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet periods, medical professionals mainly recommended that prophylactics were to be used after sexual intercourse. From the late nineteenth century, Russian physicians advised that this kind of preventative treatment should be used widely in the naval forces. In the prerevolutionary Navy, so-called individual 'prophylactic packages' were available for sailors to purchase from the end of 1909. These packages were intended for individual use and they contained various disinfectants to be applied following sexual intercourse, including a tube of silver proteinate to prevent gonorrhoea and an anti-syphilis formalin cream. 76 Pre-revolutionary naval authorities also recommended the use of condoms to protect against venereal diseases, but some physicians argued that they were an steps to manufacture individual prophylactic packages' for sailors. 78 The quality of condoms was still poor in the 1920s, and many Soviet doctors considered them to be potentially harmful for both men and women. 79 The fact the Military Soviet instructed Black Sea sailors to report to their nearest medical point to receive prophylactic treatment, rather than administering it themselves, is further evidence of the lack of available portable prophylactic means. Additionally, by administering prophylactic treatment at a clinic, rather than focusing on the mass manufacture of individual packages, naval command were able to ensure that sailors were actually using preventative measures and absorbing information from health education and propaganda. This method also allowed the naval authorities to monitor exactly who was having sex within their units, and the frequency with which this was happening. The Military Soviet's 'hands-on' approach to administering prophylactic treatment prohibited privacy and justified greater state interference into the lives of sailors. months afterwards. 82 British military personnel were also subject to 'humiliating random inspections' in which they were obliged to show their genitalia to their officers on demand. 83 Despite these similarities, the situation in the Soviet Union differed due to peacetime military conscription. Compulsory military service was abolished in the USA and Great Britain in 1918 and 1920 respectively. In the USSR, the first peacetime draft began in 1924, and the Soviet state promised conscripts various benefits including special access to health care, living quarters and preferential treatment for their children in schools. 84 By the autumn of 1925, military high command reported than ninety per cent of all eligible conscripted males appeared for induction. 85 The drafting of men into the forces during peacetime meant that the military authorities continued to interfere in the lives of a large portion of the male population outside the context of wartime.
The Soviet Union also differed in the availability of individual antiseptic prophylactic kits. During the interwar years, prophylactic packages were publicly available in some countries outside the USSR. In Britain from 1923, pharmacists were permitted to sell antiseptic prophylactic packages, although there were some restrictions on their advertisement. 86 The VD Act in Germany removed any remaining restrictions on the sale of antiseptic packages and condoms in 1927, and following this, they were readily available in railway stations, bars and cafes in most German cities. 87 In the USSR, individual prophylactic packages were not legalised until 1923, and even after this, rubber shortages halted the manufacture of condoms throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 88 There is little evidence to suggest that the Soviet government took decisive steps to manufacture personal prophylactics to protect against diseases for mass consumption, 
The urban space of Sevastopol
Sevastopol was described in Krasnyi Chernomorets as a 'magnet for prostitutes', because of its port status and reputation as a commercial hub. 97 The city was attractive for a variety of reasons: it was the largest population centre of the Crimean ASSR; the headquarters of the Black Sea fleet; and one of the few developed tourist resorts in the entire Soviet Union. 98 revolutionised venereal disease screening by introducing blood testing for greater accuracy. However, even when combining the two methods, contemporaries frequently described results as inaccurate, and physicians would have struggled to perform these two highly specialised tests effectively. 101 Gonorrhoea was even more evasive, and physicians often relied on their own empirical clinical knowledge to diagnose diseases. 102 If even the diagnosis of the disease itself was frequently inaccurate, it is reasonable to assume that the source of infection was equally uncertain. Instead, figures reveal who both sailors and the high command of the Black Sea Fleet perceived to be the most frequent transmitters of venereal diseases. These perceptions reflected their preconceptions about disease, urban space and sexual behaviour, which marked the prostitute and the city as exceptionally infectious. Their responses also suggest that the interrelation of prostitution and venereal diseases in anti-disease campaigns may have provided sailors with a convenient scapegoat. By naming the anonymous prostitute as the source of infection, they could have avoided implicating a male or female partner.
City authorities perceived that the reclassification and reordering of the urban space of Sevastopol was essential to suppress the business of prostitution. In a 1928 report sent to Muklevich, the urban landscape of Sevastopol was used to explain the high levels of prostitution in the region. The report highlighted the central site of prostitution in the city as the seaside boulevard (primorskii bul'var), which was also an infamous site for male prostitutes soliciting clients for same-sex relations in this period. 103 This thoroughfare was allegedly 'flooded with prostitutes at night' who took advantage of the lack of street lights and police in the area, enjoying relative privacy. The activities within this space, the lack of surveillance and light, helped to create an informal red-light district in Sevastopol which achieved a level of notoriety. This was also true of Victorian London,
where technological advances, such as the introduction of electric lighting on major thoroughfares, forced prostitutes to renegotiate their working environments and relocate to quieter side streets. 104 The authorities evidently believed that improving the illumination of the boulevard would destroy its reputation as a hub for prostitution. They also recommended strengthening the 'administrative supervision' of all city boulevards, and increasing police presence. 105 The space was malleable, and those directing the struggle with venereal diseases believed that it could be shaped, organised and made respectable once again.
In both Sevastopol and the wider Soviet Union, the complete removal of the brothel from the urban landscape was a key part in the struggle with venereal diseases.
The Criminal Code of 1922 made brothel keeping and pimping illegal, with a minimum sentence of three years' imprisonment. 106 From this year onwards, the Soviet authorities monitored entertainment establishments and 'suspicious' apartments in an attempt to prevent informal brothels from emerging. 107 1920s saw huge transformations in the business of prostitution, and a lessening of the distance between prostitutes and the wider urban community. Informal brothels sprang up in apartments across urban centres, where prostitutes rented as a group and shared responsibilities, without the need for a pimp or madame. 113 It was the invisibility of these establishments that troubled the authorities in Sevastopol, as apartment brothels blended in with the rest of the urban landscape. The existence of this type of brothel subverted the gaze of the city authorities, as they were unable to construct the urban space of Sevastopol in such a way that made it possible for them to 'see constantly and recognise immediately'. 114 The fact that these establishments had customers also suggests that residents of Sevastopol had a greater level of knowledge about their city than those who managed and policed it. The district committee's solution was to conduct periodic raids and patrols throughout Sevastopol in an attempt to root out these sites of prostitution. 115 By forcefully entering the space of the brothel and prosecuting those who ignored the Criminal Code, the authorities attempted to reclaim the urban space of the city.
Conclusion
This article has used the case study of Sevastopol and the Black Sea fleet to demonstrate how those in authority conceptualised the struggle with venereal diseases in the 1920s.
During this decade, the Soviet Union was still in the early stages of its history and had emerged economically and materially crippled following the destruction of the In the struggle with venereal diseases in Sevastopol, the authorities consistently named prostitutes and promiscuous women as the source of all infection, which allowed them to promote long-term sexual relationships rather than casual encounters. By dividing prostitutes into the two camps of victim and villain, high command constructed an identifiable enemy to engage the Navy and wider public to actively fight against in the context of peacetime. In the same way, the brothel was marked as a site of contagion and disease, and its clandestine status allowed city authorities to justify the greater surveillance and policing of the urban community. The remoulding and reshaping of city space was also an integral part of the struggle with diseases. High command's classification of certain areas of Sevastopol, along with certain women in the city, as polluted and contagious authorised their increased interference. Therefore, these constructions of venereal disease helped to legitimise the city and naval authorities'
interventions into the private, and intimate, lives of military personnel and the wider population.
